



THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 
 
 
International Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and 
the Cost of Bank Capital 
 
 
Phong T. H. Ngo
*
School of Economics 
College of Business and Economics 





Working Paper No. 463 
ISBN 0 86831 463 3 
 
 





                                                      
* Contact: Phong T. H. Ngo, School of Economics, HW Ardnt Building 25A, Australian National University,  
ACT 0200, Australia. Phone: +612-612-54487. Email: phong.ngo@anu.edu.au. The paper has bene.ted from 
the comments given by Tom Smith, Chris Jones, Shane Evans, Colleen Cassidy, Pornpen Sodsrichai and seminar 
participants at the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, School of Finance and Applied Statistics (ANU) 
and the CBE/APSEG seminar series at the ANU. This research was funded by the generous support of an ANU 
Research Scholarship as well as the Brian Gray Scholarship which is jointly funded by the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority and the Reserve Bank of Australia. All errors remain my own. International Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and
the Cost of Bank Capital





We de￿ne regulatory risk as any regulatory action that leads to an increase in
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11 Introduction
International ￿nance has witnessed remarkable change in the past two decades. The
removal of restrictions on cross-border capital ￿ ows and the opening up of domestic
markets to foreign competitors has seen an ever growing internationalisation of ￿nan-
cial and banking activity. This is all good given the substantial literature documenting
that well functioning ￿nancial markets accelerate economic growth, which in turn al-
leviates poverty.1 Nevertheless, looking at international ￿nancial markets over the last
two decades, some have suggested that a potential cost of ￿nancial globalisation may be
the staggering scope of ￿nancial crises that have occurred - Argentina, Mexico, Russia,
Thailand, Indonesia and the rest of South East Asia are the more prominent examples
that come to mind.2
The economic and social costs of such crises have been studied and well documented
and have thus triggered calls for reforms to ￿nancial regulation.3 As such, there has
been a wave of new regulations to hit ￿nancial sectors across the globe in recent years.
In some cases, regulatory demands coming not just from domestic regulators, but also
from international initiatives such as the Basel Capital Accords and European Union
(EU) directives.
The 1988 Basel Accord was a landmark regulatory agreement; for the ￿rst time,
regulations a⁄ecting banks in many di⁄erent countries were jointly established (Wagster,
1996).4 The ostensible goals of the Basel Accord were to minimise the systematic risk
of the international banking system and limit the competitive advantage that banks
who belonged to regulatory regimes with less stringent capital standards had ￿thereby
￿ levelling the playing ￿eld￿ .5 Ultimately, the goal of the Accord was to remove the
1See Levine (1997) for a discussion on ￿nance and growth while Dollar and Kraay (2000) provide
discussion on poverty and growth.
2It should be noted that these crises were not born out of ￿nancial liberation perse, rather, they have
more to do with these countries pursuing ￿xed exchange rate regimes and other interventionist policies
such as the rescue of insolvent banks and poor prudential standards.
3On the costs of recent crises see Boyd, Kwak and Smith (2000) and Hoggarth, Resi and Saporta
(2001).
4The Basel Accord is overseen by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee was
formed in 1974 by the central bank governors of the G-10 countries plus Switzerland and Luxembourg
in the aftermath of the failures of the Franklin National Bank in New York and Bankhaus Hersatt in
Germany. The committee is under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements and has no
formal authority, thus its agreements are carried out on a voluntary basis by the member countries
(Wagster, 1996).
5The term systematic risk belongs to the standard rhetoric of economic policy discussions relating
to the ￿nance industry. Despite the fact that systematic risk is one of the most popular buzz words
in the debate about banking regulation; it is fair to say that there is no precise de￿nition (Summer,
2002). Prima facie the literature shows that systematic risk is used as a description of many di⁄erent
2funding-cost advantage that Japanese banks had which saw them capture over a third
of international lending during the 1980s. In January 2001, the Basel Committee issued
a proposal for a Basel II Capital Accord that, once ￿nalised will replace the 1988 Basel
I Accord. The proposal is based on three pillars. The ￿rst is improved minimum capital
standards, the second focuses on better supervisory practices, and the third argues for
greater market discipline through increased information disclosed by banks. With this,
there has been an ever growing perception of regulation as an additional risk - henceforth
known as regulatory risk - which corporations must manage.
A recent article published by The Banker reporting the results of the 2003 ￿ banana
skins￿survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation claimed
that there is a long term trend of regulation increasingly being viewed as a risk - not
only by bankers but also non-bankers and analysts. One banker was quoted as saying:
￿Banks will end up managing Basel II rather than managing risk.￿ 6
While one bank chairman told the magazine that:
￿...Political dogma, enforced by socialist governments in Europe and
the UK, is increasingly damaging the commercial viability of the banking
industry.￿ 7
On the other hand, it is common place for the regulators, such as Bernie Egan of the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, to remark the following:
￿The net cost to shareholders would be quite modest. I would have thought
a small price for shareholders to pay...￿ 8
Though this may sound like a contradiction in terms: regulation is supposed to
minimise risk, not exacerbate it, the concerns of the regulated ￿rms are real and should
be examined more closely. At the very least, one should ask whether all the costs of
regulation have been taken into account when devising and implementing new policy.
This paper adds to the debate by investigating a potential cost ￿arising from regulatory
risk ￿of internationally harmonising ￿nancial regulation.
phenomena. It is used to describe crises related to ￿nancial markets, to bank runs and bank panics, to
contagion e⁄ects between ￿nancial markets.
6The Banker, ￿Regulatory Risk May Be the Next Banana Skin.￿3rd November 2003.
7ibid.
8Bernie Egan, ￿Basel II Implementation in Australia.￿Presentation at the Australian Financial Re-
view￿ s 5th Annual BankTech Conference, 14th September 2004.
3Here regulatory risk is de￿ned as any regulatory action that leads to an increase in
the ex-ante cost of capital for the regulated ￿rm. Thus, the paper studies the impact
that the international capital adequacy requirements introduced by the Basel Accord of
1988 (Basel I) may have on the cost of bank capital. The results indicate that uniform
increases in capital requirements lead to an increase in the cost of capital. However
when regulatory standards di⁄er across countries, ￿nancial integration leads to positive
spillovers which reduces the cost of capital mark up for a given increase in bank capital.
Accordingly, regulatory risk may be greater under a regulatory agreement such as Basel.
We also ￿nd that independent regulators will react to lax regulations of opposing
countries by strengthening their own regulatory standards. This is an interesting result
since the literature addressing the issue of regulatory competition concludes on the lines
that; when responding to lax ￿nancial regulations in another country, regulators will
always choose to reduce regulatory requirements - leading to the so called ￿ race to the
bottom￿ .
The next section provides a de￿nition for regulatory risk and discusses the intuition
behind and postulates the a⁄ects that capital regulation has on the cost of bank capital.
A model is then proposed in section three while section four concludes.
2 Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Capital
There is much ambiguity surrounding the de￿nition and sources of regulatory risk. To
date, there does not appear to be a precise de￿nition. The term regulatory risk has
been bantered around in policy discussions for just about every regulated industry you
would care to think of. From the traditionally regulated natural monopoly industries
like telecommunications, water, electricity, gas, railways to regulations of environment,
banking, ￿nance and pharmaceuticals to more obscure regulations such as the alcohol
content in the wine industry and the content and disclosure of information on websites.
The de￿nitions of regulatory risk span from the risk of adverse government interven-
tion to the risk of regulatory breach, none of which provide a very useful framework for
making predictions or providing us with testable implications. One would expect that
if regulation did indeed lead to greater risks that it would be re￿ ected in the regulated
entities stock price or cost of capital, thus the simplest and most useful de￿nition is:
De￿nition 1 Regulatory risk arises whenever regulation a⁄ects (increases) the ex-ante
cost of capital for a regulated ￿rm; in this case a regulated bank.
The cost of capital is the rate of return that the suppliers of capital require from
4businesses in return for the provision of those funds. Any company that cannot achieve
these returns will not be able to attract new funding. This required return is determined
within the equilibrium in the economy and will di⁄er between companies and projects
according to their risk class ￿the higher the level of risk the higher is the required rate
of return. In other words, for a given risk of the ￿rm, the cost of capital can be thought
of as the opportunity cost of funds invested in that business. Thus an increase in the
cost of capital is analogous to an increase in the risk of a ￿rm.
When regulators impose higher capital requirements that are binding, capital de-
￿cient banks are forced to hold more capital.9 Consequently, their value will decline
if their capital structure moves away from its optimal level and/or their ability to ex-
propriate deposit-insurance subsidies from the insuring agency is reduced will lead to
an increase in their cost of capital. Additionally (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990) argue
that bank equity is uniquely costly, and that this cost comes from the role of demand
deposits as an e¢ cient means of exchange. The crucial point is, unlike deposits, bank
equity is very sensitive to private information, making it a bad medium for exchange.
Thus, forcing banks to increase capital means that in general equilibrium, consumers
must hold more bank equity (the less preferred medium of exchange) in aggregate and
therefore demand a higher expected return on equity in compensation or put simply, a
higher cost of capital.10
3 The Model
The model proposed in this paper draws from the wisdom of several authors. In their
seminal paper, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) advocate that banks provide liquidity by
acting as risk-sharing arrangements to insure against depositors￿random consumption
needs. This model is Diamond-Dybvig like in that it is concerned with the idea that
banks provide liquidity for consumers with uncertain consumption preferences. How-
9Banks with capital holdings above the minimum requirement should not be a⁄ected as much as
banks with capital holdings below the new requirement. Although banks currently hold capital well
in excess of what is o¢ cially required by regulatory authorities, at the time of inception of the Basel
Accord, almost all banks where capital de￿cient and were required to raise signi￿cant amounts of capital.
10I mean general equilibrium in the Gorton and Winton (2000) sense where increases in capital re-
quirements necessitates some agents in the economy to rebalance their portfolios by substituting one
kind of bank liability for another. It should be noted that in this paper, the focus is on the cost of bank
equity capital leaving aside considerations of the cost of debt capital. It is generally agreed upon that
the determination of the cost of debt is relatively straightforward and is generally not a controversial
issue (Grout, 1995). Furthermore, it is frequently established that the cost of equity exceeds that cost
of debt and all of the complications related to the estimation of the cost of capital crop up with the
measurement of the cost of equity capital owing to tax considerations, asymmetric information, agency
costs and moral hazard problems arising from deposit insurance.
5ever, unlike Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where early liquidation of real assets causes an
exogenous loss, the model presented here follows Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) where in-
formation asymmetries between investors lead to a wealth transfer from liquidity traders
to strategic traders.11 Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) point out - with reference to Jack-
lin (1987) and Cone (1983) - that a pivotal assumption made by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) is that agents cannot trade equity claims on physical assets. Contrary to this, it
is the presence of informed traders which motivates the formation of an intermediary in
their model.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) suggest that investors with uncertain consumption
needs may be required to ￿nance unexpected high consumption by selling any securities
they hold before their cash ￿ ows have been realised. To the extent that strategic trading
can occur, the investor with such liquidity needs will be exposed to trading losses. How-
ever, if investors hold risk free securities whose payo⁄s are fully known to all investors,
they will not su⁄er trading losses to strategic traders. Consequently, there is a demand
for low risk trading securities and banks meet this demand by issuing demand deposits.12
The important point to note from their paper is that relative to bank deposits, bank
equity is very sensitive to private information thus making it relatively costly and a bad
medium of exchange.
In this framework Gorton and Winton (2000) analyse the impact of a system wide
increase in capital requirements on the cost of bank equity. They use a general equi-
librium setting where banks produce demand deposits and create and hold loans. The
model is general equilibrium in the sense that market clearing conditions require that
bank capital increases are matched by decreases in total deposits as some agents in the
economy rebalance their portfolios. The work of Gorton and Winton (2000) is unique in
their emphasis of the role of bank deposits which lead to a unique cost of bank equity
capital in general equilibrium. Much of the earlier theoretical work in bank capital
was partial equilibrium and took the cost of bank equity capital as exogenous.13 The
11The notion that informed agents can systematically exploit uninformed traders has received support
from authors such as Kyle (1985) and Grinblatt and Ross (1985). They show that ￿ insiders￿can be
the bene￿ciaries of ￿ outsider￿trading losses when prices are not fully revealing. Note that these models
assume the uninformed traders - called ￿ noise￿traders - are non-optimising agents; they simply trade
and lose money. However, in the model presented here - like that of Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and
Gorton and Winton (2000) - the uninformed agents have uncertain consumption preferences but are still
optimising agents.
12To the extent that deposits are not riskless, it is assumed that government deposit insurance can
improve welfare.
13This earlier work provided con￿ icting answers and tended to look at whether banks increased the
risk of their asset portfolios when faced with an increase in the required capital ratio. The regulation
of bank capital is often justi￿ed to attain a balance between the con￿ icting objectives of preventing
6discipline of general equilibrium is essential for their results as it is for the results of this
paper.
In general equilibrium, two aspects of banking create a tension in setting bank capital
levels. On one hand, bank capital is (presumed) needed to prevent the social and private
costs of bank failure. On the other hand, if capital requirements are binding then some
agents in the economy must be induced to hold bank equity, which means that they must
be compensated for the additional costs associated with having to sell the equity when
liquidity needs arise. If regulators increase system wide capital requirements ￿or as is
the case with the Basel Accord, global increases in capital requirements ￿in aggregate,
investors must hold more equity in their portfolios, increasing the chance that they must
sell it to meet consumption needs and thus increasing the cost of capital.
In what follows I model the relationship between private and social incentives to
increase bank capital with the extent of regulatory forbearance and look at the impact of
a global increase in capital requirements on the cost of bank capital. The model is largely
inspired by Gorton and Winton (2000), however, I extend their model by (i) looking more
closely at how capture and competition in regulation in￿ uences regulatory forbearance
(ii) endogenising regulatory forbearance into the choice of capital requirements (iii)
incorporating multiple economies.
3.1 Single Economy Model
There are four dates in the model economy, T = 0;1;2;3 and a single consumption good.
There is a single banking sector with a continuum of homogeneous banks, a continuum
of risk neutral consumers, a bank regulator, and many competitive, risk neutral market
makers. The following assumptions detail the model.
Consumer Preferences: All consumers are identical as of T = 0. As in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) each faces privately observed, uninsurable risk of being an ￿ early￿
consumer. That is, consumers either consume at date 2 or 3 and vary in how likely they
are to consume early (i.e. su⁄er a liquidity shock). At T = 1 consumers realise their
probability of being an early consumer (i.e. consume at T = 2), with say probability
t. However, the shock itself does not occur until the beginning of T = 2. There is a
costly bank runs with the moral hazard induced by the deposit insurance (Berger, Herring and Szego,
1995; Kaufman, 1991; Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990). Nevertheless, whether the
implementation of capital requirements actually reduces bank risk-taking incentives is still a moot point
amongst researchers. As an example, authors such as Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980),
Lam and Chen (1985), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), Genotte and Pyle (1991), Rochet
(1992), Besanko and Katanas (1996), and Blum (1999) argue that actual capital requirements can lead
to an increase in bank risk taking behaviour.
7continuum of risk neutral consumers with total mass of 1 who each have a unique type
(probability) t and the total distribution of types is uniform over [0;1]. It follows that
the total mass of consumers who su⁄er the liquidity shock and must consume early is
precisely t. Given this framework, and de￿ning CT (t) as type t￿ s consumption at time
T; a consumer of type t has expected utility at T = 1 of:
EU (C2 (t);C3 (t)) = tC2 (t) + (1 ￿ t)C3 (t) (1)
Endowments and Initial Portfolios: At T = 0, all agents receive endowments of
one unit of a capital good which is invested to earn a return in the form of a consumption
good at T = 3. Additionally, at T = 2, agents receive an extra endowment of G units
of the consumption good.14 The focus is on established banking systems that have
outstanding loans and equity capital, consequently, the representative bank has issued
D0 deposits promising to pay an exogenous interest factor RD at either T = 2 or T = 3
per unit of capital good invested and N0 shares - with each shareholder holding n0
shares.15 Since consumers are risk neutral they will optimally choose portfolios that are
either all deposits or all equity, we will see later that selling equity at T = 2 involves
a discount, thus, consumers with the lowest probability of consuming early (lowest t)
will hold portfolios consisting entirely of equity. As a result, there must exist a marginal
shareholder of type t￿ who is indi⁄erent between holding shares or deposits such that all
consumers with t < t￿ will hold equity so that in general equilibrium N0 = n0t￿. Market
clearing implies that the remaining consumers hold deposits, that is D0 = 1 ￿ t￿.
Bank Technology: Capital is homogeneous, and each unit produces the same ran-
dom return, ~ r. It is assumed that ~ r is non-negative and belongs to a symmetric distri-
bution with mean R, distribution H (:) and density h(:) which implies that ~ r 2 [0;2R].
The assumption of symmetry is not essential however does simplify later analysis. Let
us specify an exogenous private bank charter value CP. If the bank is solvent at T = 3
then CP is preserved - and thus divided amongst the shareholders - otherwise, the bank
fails and CP is completely lost. Gorton and Winton (2000) point out that this private
charter value is aimed at capturing the informational quasi-rents that banks are assumed
to accrue in the lending process by having private information about their lending op-
portunities and this private information about borrowers is an intangible asset that has
14Gorton and Winton (2000) introduce this T = 2 endowment to ensure consumption for early con-
sumers and to simplify taxation to support deposit insurance. They assume that G is large enough to
pay for deposit insurance and early consumption.
15Although not essential to the results, it is assumed that agents can store consumption goods between
T = 2 and T = 3 at no cost which rules out any di⁄erence between the deposit rate at T = 2 and that
of T = 3.
8value contingent on the bank￿ s continued operation. Moreover, the social cost of bank
failure is generally regarded as being greater than the private costs. Generally speaking,
the reason for this widely held belief stems from the so called ￿ contagion e⁄ect￿or simply
systematic risk - the notion that a bank failure could have knock on e⁄ects that cause
di¢ culties for other ￿nancial institutions. Accordingly, de￿ne the bank￿ s social charter
value as CS ￿ CP. As with private charter value, this social charter value dissipates if
the bank fails.
Regulator: There is a regulator in the economy, such as the Central Bank who
designs regulatory mechanisms with the goal of maximising aggregate social welfare.
Deposits are insured, regulators levy lump sum taxes, L, to support deposit insurance
and enforce capital standards to mitigate the moral hazard costs of insurance. Deposit
insurance and capital requirements are both ex-ante mechanisms aimed at reducing the
likelihood of bank failure. Later we relax the assumption that the regulator￿ s objective
is to maximise social welfare to include the possibility of capture or competition in
regulation.
Market Makers: For simplicity it is assumed that there exists many competitive,
risk neutral market makers who compete for trades by o⁄ering bid and ask prices, PB
and PA respectively.16 Bertrand competition ensures that competitive market makers
earn zero economic rents so that each price fully re￿ ects the expected value of the share
- conditional on it being bought or sold.
Timing: At T = 0 banks exist with D0 deposits o⁄ering a rate of RD and N0 shares
of equity. At T = 1 regulators announce new capital standards and banks raise more
capital.17 The representative bank raises an amount of capital K1 = N1P1 where N1 is
the total number of new shares issued and P1 is the issue price per share. Since existing
shareholders hold portfolios made up entirely of equity, this new capital must come from
existing depositors. Once again, consumers with the lowest probability of su⁄ering a
liquidity shock will ￿nd it optimal to hold this new equity. So as capital is raised, the
marginal shareholder changes, precisely, there must be a new marginal shareholder ^ t > t￿
who is indi⁄erent between holding deposits or equity so that all consumers with t < ^ t
strictly prefer holding only equity. Accordingly
￿
^ t ￿ t￿￿
depositors strictly prefer equity.
If each depositor buys n1 shares such that n1P1 = 1 (i.e. use up all their deposits)
16It is assumed that there is a single bid and ask price regardless of trade size.
17Banks may raise capital either on their own accord or at the demand of the regulator. Although,
banks can choose either to raise capital or exit the industry (or be forced to exit if they do not meet
capital requirements); for now we assume that capital requirements bind and regulators can credibly
enforce them. We can then concentrate on the symmetric outcome where banks raise the same amount
of capital.
9then it follows that N1 = n1
￿
^ t ￿ t￿￿
. Market clearing implies that K1 = D0 ￿ D1 (i.e.
the increase in capital must equal change in deposits), but we also know that the new
deposit level is D1 = 1 ￿ ^ t so it logically follows that K1 = (1 ￿ t￿) ￿
￿
1 ￿ ^ t
￿
= ^ t ￿ t￿.
At T = 2 all consumers receive an extra endowment of G and regulators levy lump
sum taxes of L to cover expected shortfalls in deposit insurance. New shareholders
decide whether to expend resources to acquire private information about their bank￿ s
asset returns at T = 3; the utility cost of gathering information is exogenously set at c
units of consumption. We assume for simplicity that old shareholders as ￿ insiders￿can
costlessly acquire this private information. Shareholders with private information receive
a signal (at T = 2) as to whether the bank￿ s asset returns will be above or below the
mean return R at T = 3. Immediately thereafter, consumers ￿nd out whether they su⁄er
a liquidity shock (consume early) or not (consume late). Following this, early consumers
exchange their ￿nancial claims for units of consumption. Shareholders sell their equity
to late consumers in exchange for part of the late consumers T = 2 endowment and
depositors withdraw their deposits from their banks. Note however that bank assets
do not yield consumption until T = 3, thus banks must buy consumption from late
consumers to pay for withdraws from early consumers and issue demand deposits to
the late consumers in exchange. In aggregate banks simply act as a means for early
consumers to trade their deposits to late consumers in exchange for consumption goods
at T = 2. At the climax of T = 2, early consumers consume while it is assumed that late
consumers can costlessly store (hoard) any residual T = 2 endowments. This ensures
that insured deposits will trade at a one for one ratio with consumption at T = 3.18
At T = 3 bank asset returns are realised and divided among investors. If a bank
is unable to honour its deposits at face value then it fails and the private charter value
is lost otherwise the private charter value is implicitly consumed by the shareholders.
Finally, late consumers consume. The model is solved recursively. The behaviour at
T = 3 is elementary, so we begin the analysis at T = 2.
3.1.1 Strategic and Liquidity Trading at T = 2
Old shareholders and new shareholders who gather information at a cost of c units of
consumption receive a signal informing them whether the bank￿ s asset returns at T = 3
are above or below the mean return R. We call this group of investors informed since
they can use this information advantageously to trade shares. Shareholders who su⁄er
liquidity shocks must sell their shares to meet early consumption needs (regardless of
18Equivalently we can assume that late consumers are able to invest their residual T = 2 endowments
in a risk free asset which yields zero net return.
10whether they are informed or not), as a result, they may be exploited by the informed
traders; we call this group of shareholders ￿ liquidity￿traders (sellers). Note however, that
gathering information is a necessary however not su¢ cient condition for a shareholder to
be able to act strategically on this information; to be a ￿ strategic￿trader a shareholder
needs to have gathered information as well as be a late consumer.19
There is perfect information on the ￿ ask￿side of the market since only informed
shareholders will buy shares - the model has no ￿ liquidity￿buyers. Since informed traders
only buy shares if the shares are priced fairly, market makers will be able to infer from
the demand for shares (or lack there of) whether returns will be above or below average
and set PA accordingly. However, the model does entertain the notion of ￿ liquidity￿
sellers, thus strategic traders can pro￿t from selling shares at bid price when they know
that bank returns will be below average.20
Let us de￿ne E+
2 and E￿
2 as the expected value of the bank￿ s equity conditional on
asset returns being above and below the mean return respectively. Assuming there is
equal probability that asset returns will be above or below average, the expected value of



















. The values of E1and ￿
depend on whether or not the banks promised payments on deposits, RDD1, are above
the mean return R. The focus here is on the case where RDD1 < R which implies
that the bank￿ s ex-ante chance of failure is less than one half which seems a reasonable














rh(r)dr + (CP ￿ RDD1)[1 ￿ 2H (RDD1)]




19Incidently, old shareholders are the most likely to be able to trade strategically since they can gather
information costlessly and have the lowest probability of early consumption.
20Short sales are ruled out for simplicity.
21Gorton and Winton (2000) consider the case where RDD1 > R, however we astract from this
complication in this paper.
22Derivations of equations can be obtained upon request.
11Thus if a good signal is obtained the bank survives with certainty, honours deposits
at par, retains private charter value and returns exceed the mean by 2
R R
0 H (r)dr. If a
bad signal is received then the bank survives with probability [1 ￿ 2H (RDD1)], in which
case it honours its debt at par, retains its charter value and returns are below the mean
by 2
R R
RDD1 H (r)dr. It it straight forward to see that:












We now consider the equilibrium information gathering decision and market clearing
price at T = 2. Suppose a new shareholder (those who buy shares at T = 1) of type t
becomes informed, with probability t they will face a liquidity shock and are forced to
sell their their stock at the bid price PB. Thus with probability 1￿t they will be able to
act strategically; half of the time banks asset returns will be above average so it will pay
to hold on to the shares and receive E+
2 , the rest of the time bank returns will be below
average in which case they will rationally sell the shares and receive PB. Accordingly,




























A new shareholder who does not become informed has probability t of selling their
shares at bid price to ￿nance early consumption and has probability 1￿t that they will




[tPB + (1 ￿ t)E1] (7)
A rational shareholder will gather information if TRI exceeds TRU, which is the
same as:
23Old shareholders obtain information costlessly so will have a total return similar to that of in-





















The bid price PB is the expected value of a share conditional on it being sold. Now,














E1 = (1 ￿ ￿)E1 (9)
Consequently, at T = 2, instead of receiving a price of E1, because of their relative
lack of information, liquidity sellers receive a discounted price, where ceteris paribus,
the discount ￿ is increasing both in the relative risk of bank equity ￿
E1 and the relative
volume of strategic trades S
S+￿. Substituting (9) into (8), we have that a new shareholder







￿ ￿ c ￿ 0 (10)
That is, informed sellers receive a pro￿t over and above the share￿ s true value E￿
2
which is proportional to the riskiness of bank equity ￿ and the relative volume of liquidity
trades ￿
S+￿.
It is possible that some, none or all new shareholders satisfy (10). De￿ne the new





We can now calculate S and ￿. Recalling that informed shareholders sell strategically
with probability
(1￿t)













































^ t + t￿￿
(12)
In sum, given the marginal informed shareholder tI, the equilibrium stock price PB
at T = 2 is determined by (9) where strategic trading S is given by (11) and liquidity
trading ￿ is given by (12). The information gathering decision is summarised by the
13marginal informed shareholder tI. If the left hand side of (10) is negative at t = t￿,
then no new shareholders become informed and tI = t￿. If the left hand side of (10)
is positive at t = ^ t, then all new shareholders become informed and tI = ^ t. Otherwise,
tI is a unique value between t￿ and ^ t for which (10) holds with equality, and all new
shareholders in [t￿;tI] become informed.
3.1.2 Equilibrium When Banks Raise Capital at T = 1
We now move from the secondary stock market at T = 2 to the primary market at T = 1
in which banks issue additional equity. This section determines the equilibrium issue
price for equity P1 given that all banks raise the same amount of capital - this in turn
determines the banks￿cost of capital. As one would expect, P1 takes into account the
equilibrium at T = 2 where early consumers who must sell their shares face possible
losses to informed shareholders￿strategic behaviour.
Suppose that all banks raise an amount of capital K1 by issuing N1 shares at an
issue price of P1 per share. Recall that market clearing requires that total deposits fall
by the same magnitude as the increase in capital so we have K1 = P1N1 = D0 ￿ D1.
The new marginal shareholder must be indi⁄erent between buying a share at price P1
or holding onto P1 units of deposits and eventually earning RDP1. Since the marginal
shareholder depends in part on whether or not they choose to gather information, Gorton
and Winton (2000) assume that (i) the cost of gathering information is su¢ ciently low so
that at least some new shareholders choose to acquire information and (ii) the marginal





Given these assumptions, the typical consumer￿ s maximisation problem at T = 1 is to
optimally choose their amount of new shares n1 and new level of deposits D1 to maximise
expected utility taking as given the issue price of equity P1 and initial level of deposits
D0. That is, the consumer￿ s problem is:
Max
n1(t); D1(t)
EU (C2 (t);C3 (t)) = tC2 (t) + (1 ￿ t)C3 (t) (13)
subject to
1. C2 (t) = RDD1(t) +
n1(t)
N0+N1(1 ￿ ￿)E1 + G ￿ L
2. C3 (t) = RDD1(t) +
n1(t)
N0+N1E1 + G ￿ L
24Gorton and Winton (2000) assume that information gathering is not binding to proxy for the more
realistic but complex setting where information is available in increasing degrees of precision, so that
shareholders can always attain more information if they wish to.
143. P1n1(t) = D0(t) ￿ D1(t)
4. n1(t) ￿ 0
5. D1(t) ￿ 0
The ￿rst constraint is an early consumers￿budget constraint at T = 2; they consume
by withdrawing deposits at RD per unit, selling their share in equity
n1(t)
N0+N1 at bid price
PB = (1 ￿ ￿)E1, consuming their T = 2 endowment G less lump sum taxes L. The
second constraint is a late consumer￿ s budget constraint at T = 3, save they do not face
potential losses to strategic traders and get the full value of their total equity. Three
says that the consumer purchases their new shares with existing deposits. Four and ￿ve
are non-negativity constraints. The ￿rst order condition yields the following result.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium and the Cost of Bank Capital at T = 1)
Suppose at T = 1 all banks raise capital by K1, then all consumers with t < ^ t use all
their deposits to buy shares such that each buys n1 = 1
P1 shares. Then the equilibrium
price of bank equity P1 satis￿es
P1RD =




As noted the new marginal shareholder must be indi⁄erent between buying one share
out of N0 +N1 shares or holding onto P1 units of deposits and eventually earning RDP1
- the value of the former is given by the right hand side. This marginal shareholder￿ s
indi⁄erence condition is what yields equation (14). Also, because consumers are risk
neutral all inframarginal shareholders strictly prefer holding portfolios consisting only
of deposits.
Proposition 1 tells us that due to the presence of strategic traders when some con-
sumers face a liquidity shock at T = 2, knowing this at T = 1, depositors demand a
marked up return of RD
1￿^ t￿ per dollar of deposit to induce them to buy new shares - they
demand a lower price per share or equivalently a higher expected return on equity in
compensation. Since banks need to raise K1 dollars of equity in total then the aggregate
expected value of new shareholders share of the total value of equity is RDK1
1￿^ t￿ : 25
25Note that the scaling factor 1￿^ t￿ re￿ ects the marginal share holders probability of being forced to
consume early ^ t. Inframarginal new shareholders value shares more highly, but they know that banks
are going to raise capital in the amount of K1, thus know that the market clearing price re￿ ects ^ t rather
than their own lower chances of su⁄ering a liquidity shock.
153.1.3 Social and Private Welfare at T = 1
We now turn the analysis to the incentives of regulators and banks to raise capital at
T = 1. For now it is assumed that regulators have the objective of maximising social
welfare, that is, maximise aggregate welfare of all agents assigning equal importance
to the welfare of shareholders and depositors. De￿ne WS (K1) to be the aggregate
expected social welfare function as a function of the new amount of capital raised at
T = 1. In this model raising capital is bene￿cial to social welfare because it reduces
the probability of bankruptcy. Thus net of information gathering costs we assume
that raising capital improves social welfare.26 More precisely, we are assuming that
the social welfare function that regulators are attmepting to maximise is increasing in
capital. That is, dWS




The decision as to whether an individual bank raises capital or not is made by the
banks old shareholders (those who already held shares at T = 0). Assume that share-
holders act to maximise their private welfare WP (K1) which is a function of the amount
of capital raised at T = 1. It has been shown that raising capital is costly for banks
and we assume that these costs outweigh the potential bene￿ts. That is, we assume
the combination of liquidity e⁄ects and strategic trading means that issuing equity is
always bad for old shareholders. Intuitively, due to the existence of negative externali-
ties from bank failure, debt overhang e⁄ects created by deposit insurance (Myers, 1977)
and the combined costs of liquidity and strategic trading e⁄ects of equity issuance make
issuing additional equity to support higher capital standards always less attractive for
shareholders than it is for the regulator. That is dWP




The preceding discussion has presented the baseline Gorton and Winton (2000) model
where we were able to show that increasing capital requirements leads to a discount on
the newly issued share price or equivalently and increase in the cost of bank equity
capital. It was also assumed that the social incentive to increase capital is greater than
that of private incentives which naturally create tensions between regulators and banks
when setting capital requirement standards. In this setting, I next analyse the impact
of capture and competition in regulation, linking it to regulatory forbearance.
3.2 Capture, Competition and Forbearance in Regulation
In the preceding sections, I presented a model in which the cost of bank equity capital
is endogenously determined in general equilibrium. An important assumption made was
26Gorton and Winton (2000) show that information gathering costs are a dead weight loss.
27Gorton and Winton (2000) derive speci￿c functional forms for WS (K1) and WP (K1).
16that regulatory objectives were to maximise aggregate social welfare WS (K1), and that
regulators were able to enforce banks to raise an exogenous amount of capital K1. In
this section I allow for di⁄erences in regulatory objectives that endogenises the exercised
levels of forbearance and therefore the levels of capital that banks must raise. I de￿ne
forbearance to be regulators reneging of previously tough policies, or simply, forbearance
is the lax enforcement of capital requirements.
I begin the analysis in this section by appealing to two facts. First, the political
economy of regulation implies that some regulators are more closely aligned with an
interest group, such as bank owners. This ￿ public choice￿or ￿ capture￿view emphasises the
important role of interest groups in determining regulatory outcomes, and although most
authors attribute this intellectual wisdom to Stigler (1971) and later Peltzman (1976) and
Becker (1983), its origin has deep roots and can be traced back to Marx who argued that
big businesses sought and paid for control of important economic institutions (La⁄ont
and Tirole, 1991). Empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found in Kane
(1990) who documents proof of regulatory capture in the United States￿Savings and
Loans debarcle, and White￿ s (1982) commentary on the evolution of banking regulation
in the United States. More recently, Slinko et al (2004) provide evidence of capture
across a number of industries in Russia.
Second, to the extent that regulators are concerned about the old shareholders of
their domestic banks, they may lower regulatory requirements in order to provide them
with an advantage over foreign banks (Acharya, 2003; Dell￿ Ariccia and Marquez, 2001;
Holthausen and Rłnde, 2003). Niskanen (1971) amongst others provide another rationale
for competition in regulation. Given the possibility of international banks engaging in
￿ regulatory arbitrage￿by switching to lower-cost regulators to reduce the costs of compli-
ance. For relatively stringent (high-cost) regulators this regulatory competition will see
their regulatory market shares eroded. Accordingly, in view of protecting their market
share, these high-cost regulators will either reduce their regulatory burdens or increase
regulatory subsidies. This type of regulatory ￿ race to the bottom￿or ￿ competition in
laxity￿as regulators attempt to attract business into their domain with ever more lax
regulatory standards has been the catalyst for arguments in favour of international har-
monisation of regulatory standards before reaching the bottom of the barrel. Although
this issue is not formally dealt with until the next section when multiple economies are
incorporated into the model, it should be noted here that this ￿ competition in laxity￿
can also enter the regulator￿ s objective function.
Accordingly, I generalise the regulator￿ s objective function to one that maximises the
weighted average of aggregate welfare for old shareholders and aggregate social welfare,
17with weights ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿) respectively, thus:
W￿(K1) = ￿WP(K1) + (1 ￿ ￿)WS(K1) (15)
The parameter ￿ 2 [0;1] can be thought of as the degree of regulatory capture (or
regulatory competition). If ￿ = 1 then W￿(K1) = WP(K1), which corresponds to a
situation where regulators are completely captured and care only about existing share-
holders. While ￿ = 0 implies that W￿(K1) = WS(K1), which represents the normative
case of aggregate social welfare maximisation described thus far in the paper. Because
of government ownership of banks, government in￿ uences over regulatory agencies as
well as the time inconsistency in enforcing ex-ante optimal regulatory policies - which
typically bene￿ts bank owners - many regulators would be classi￿ed as having a weight
of ￿ > 0.
We recognise the impact of regulatory capture or competition (or some combination
of both) on the exercised level of forbearance and consequently the amount of capital
that regulators require banks to raise at T = 1 in the following result:
Lemma 1 (Capture and Forbearance)
As the degree of regulatory capture increases, the level of exercised forbearance in-
creases and thus the amount of capital that banks are required to raise by regulators
decreases. That is, the amount of capital banks are required to raise at T = 1 is decreas-
ing in regulatory capture or dK1
d￿ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straight forward. We assumed that the increase in
aggregate social welfare - for a given increase in the level of capital - is always greater
than the change in aggregate private welfare. Therefore, as regulatory capture in-
creases, the regulators objective function becomes increasingly aligned with that of the
old shareholders who have a preference for lower capital requirements.
Whether it is because regulators are more captured or are competing more intensely
(or some combination of both), this setup allows us to analyse situations where regulators
from di⁄erent countries have di⁄ering ￿ tastes￿for regulation and place greater or less
emphasis on existing bank shareholders versus aggregate social welfare. This is the issue
I take up in the rest of the paper.
183.3 Two Country Model
Financial integration generates the potential for ￿ spillovers￿from one country to another
arising from di⁄ering regulatory practices. To study these potential spillovers from one
country￿ s regulations to other countries and their regulations, I extend the model to two
countries.
Consider two countries, A and B. The banking sector in each country consists of
a continuum of homogeneous banks, a continuum of risk neutral consumers uniformly
distributed on [0;1], many competitive risk neutral market makers and a regulator, as
in the single economy case already presented.
Banks operate across countries, o⁄er the same exogenous deposit rate RD and have
equal access to deposit and lending opportunities. There are no restrictions on whether
consumers￿invest (buy shares or deposits) in their domestic or the foreign bank. The
consumers in the two countries su⁄er independent liquidity shocks, however these shocks
occur with the same probability t in each country. Regulators may adopt regulatory
policies with di⁄ering levels of forbearance toward the banks chartered in their respective
countries. The di⁄ering levels of forbearances re￿ ect the degrees of capture in each
country and are denoted ￿A and ￿B respectively.
Under this setting, what is the e⁄ect of the level of capture in country A on the cost
of equity capital of the banks in country B? First I assume that the regulator in country
A is relatively more captured, that is ￿A > ￿B. In this situation, I show that the cost of
equity capital for country B￿ s banks is decreasing in the level of capture (forbearance)
of country A￿ s regulator. This e⁄ect is called the ￿ spillover￿from country A to country
B.
Lemma 2 (The New Marginal Shareholder)
Ceteris paribus, if ￿A > ￿B then KA
1 < KB
1 and the new marginal shareholder for
banks chartered in country B is ~ tB =
^ tA+^ tB
2 < ^ tB.
Proof. See Appendix.
Allowing for a di⁄erence in forbearance between the two countries captures the in-
stitutional reality that although the Basel Accord has taken large steps in attempting to
harmonise capital standards globally, individual countries have maintained large discre-
tion on the determination of which assets can be used to meet capital requirements.28
28Gorton and Winton (2000) argue that actions by national countries to broaden the de￿nition of
capital has considerably weakened capital adequacy standards and led to signi￿cant heterogeneity in the
de￿nition of capital across countries.
19Lemma 1 states that the exercised level of forbearance increases as the level of regu-
latory capture increases resulting in a lower required increase in bank capital. It follows
that if the regulator in country A is relatively more captured then they must also exercise
a higher level of forbearance thus demanding a lower increase in bank capital at T = 1.
In other words, assuming ￿A > ￿B implies that KA
1 < KB
1 . It is straight forward to see
from proposition 1 that if these two countries were segmented then the cost of capital in
country A will be lower than the cost of capital in country B. This result follows from
the fact that because regulator A is relatively more captured and therefore requires less
capital to be raised at T = 1 the new marginal shareholder in country A, ^ tA, has a lower
probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock - relative to country B - and thus values bank
equity more highly than the marginal shareholder in country B, ^ tB.
However, when the two countries are ￿nancially integrated then banks from country
B can - in a cost of capital sense - bene￿t from country A￿ s lax enforcement of capital
requirements. Recall that when the countries are segmented then ^ tA < ^ tB. It follows
that, relative to country A, there must be ^ tB ￿ ^ tA more consumers in country B who
become new shareholders at T = 1. Given that consumers in both countries are identical
- conditional on their probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock - they will have the same
valuation of the banks in country B.
Consequently, when the countries become integrated, it is rational for banks in coun-
try B to issue new stock to consumers who value it most highly (have a lower probability
of consuming at T = 2) regardless of whether they are from country A or B. Accord-
ingly, instead of issuing all new equity only to consumers in country B, banks in country
B will raise capital domestically up to a level that is equal to the amount that country
A￿ s banks raise (domestically) and then raise the additional required amount of capi-
tal demanded by the regulator in country B - that is, the amount of capital over and
above the amount demanded by the regulator in country A - by issuing new equity to
consumers in both countries. In fact, banks in country B will raise exactly half of the
remaining required capital from consumers in country B and the other half from con-
sumers in country A. In other words, the new marginal shareholder for country B￿ s
banks will lie exactly half way between the new marginal shareholder for country A, ^ tA,
and the new marginal shareholder for country B when the countries are segmented, ^ tB.
Explicitly, the new marginal shareholder for country B￿ s banks when the countries are
integrated will be ~ tB =
^ tA+^ tB
2 < ^ tB.
Recall however that this mark up in the cost of capital demanded by new shareholders
at T = 1 stems from the presence of strategic traders when some consumers face a
liquidity shock at T = 2. So aside from the marginal consumer￿ s probability of su⁄ering
20a liquidity shock (which determines the marginal valuation of new bank equity) we also
need to consider the possible a⁄ect that this spillover of depositors from country A
to country B may have on the ￿ lemons￿discount on the share price at T = 2 in the
secondary market. Remember that the liquidity sellers receive a discounted bid price




in mind we have the following result.
Lemma 3 (Equity Discount at T=2 when Countries are Integrated)
Relative to the scenario where the countries are ￿nancially segmented, with an un-
changed relative risk of the bank in country B, ￿B
EB
1
, ￿nancial integration decreases the
volume of liquidity trades, ￿B, proportionately more than the decrease in volume of
strategic trades, SB, resulting in the relative volume of strategic trades, SB
SB+￿B, increas-
ing. Consequently, the T = 2 discount for country B￿ s bank equity increases. That is
~ ￿B > ￿B, where ~ ￿B is the integrated economies discount and ￿B is the segmented
economies discount.
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straight forward to see that the relative risk of the bank in country B does
not change. The expected value of equity at the end of T = 1, EB
1 , and the standard
deviation across realisations, ￿B, are determined by equations (4) and (5) respectively.
We can see from equations (4) and (5) that the only endogenous factor that will change
the expected return or risk of the ￿rm is the new level of deposits that they hold at
T = 1, D1, all other variables are assumed exogenous. Although integration allows
banks in country B to issue their stock to consumers who value it most highly in both
countries, the absolute number of consumers who give up their deposits in exchange for
equity remains unchanged and thus the new deposit level is unchanged post integration.
Integration means that banks in country B will sell some of its T = 1 equity to
consumers in country A. This reduces the probability of the marginal (and inframar-
ginal) shareholder su⁄ering a liquidity shock and e⁄ectively decreases the ￿ aggregate￿
probability that new shareholders will have to consume early leading to a reduction in
the volume of liquidity traders. This reduction in the volume of liquidity traders will,
ceteris paribus, reduce the incentive for new shareholders to gather information as given
by equation (10). Of course this leads to a reduction in the number of strategic traders.
However, one would logically expect the fall in volume of strategic traders to be smaller
than the fall in the volume of liquidity traders. This is because we orignally assumed that
there was a unique shareholder for which the information gathering condition - equation
(10) - held with equality. That is, the new marginal informed shareholder lay somewhere
21between the old marginal shareholder and the new marginal shareholder. Thus, it would
be logical to expect that post integration the marginal shareholder would once again lo-
cate somewhere between the new marginal shareholder and the old marginal shareholder
which determines the number of strategic traders. Accordingly, the T = 2 discount on
country B￿ s bank equity will be higher.
The preceding discussion established that post integration the marginal shareholder
~ tB has a lower probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock than the segmented economies
marginal shareholder ^ tB and therefore values country B￿ s bank equity more highly, thus
demands a smaller discount on the issue price or equivalently a lower mark up in the
expected return (cost of capital) in compensation. On the other hand, the increase in
the T = 2 discount will lead to an increase in the cost of capital. These two e⁄ects
o⁄set each other, so before any result can be presented we need to make the following
qualifying assumption. It is assumed that the e⁄ect on the cost of capital from the
reduction in the marginal shareholder￿ s probability of consuming early is greater than
the e⁄ect of the increase in the T = 2 discount. This assumption seems plausible since
the reduction in the new marginal shareholder￿ s probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock
enters directly into the cost of capital calculation as given by equation (14) while the
increase in the T = 2 discount is less direct. The increase in the T = 2 discount comes
about because of the change in the new marginal￿ s shareholder￿ s probability of consuming
early, which then reduces the number of liquidity traders, then impacts on the number
of new shareholders who choose to gather information, which ￿nally reduces the volume
of strategic trades before the increase in the T = 2 discount enters the cost of capital
calculation. With this in mind we have the following result.
Proposition 2 (International Spillover)
Ceteris Paribus, in ￿nancially integrated economies, the cost of capital for banks
chartered in country B is decreasing in the level of capture of country A￿ s regulator.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result tells us that, other things being equal, as the regulator in country A
becomes more captured or is competing more intensely with other regulators to either
maintain their regulatory market share or favour banks chartered in their country or
some combination of all three, whatever the reason, the level of exercised forbearance
increases. With this, the amount of capital that the regulator in country A requires to
be raised declines. By lemma 2 this leads to a reduction in the probability of the new
marginal shareholder of country B￿ s banks experiencing a liquidity shock while lemma 3
suggests that the discount on country B￿ s bank equity at T = 2 increases. In aggregate
22it is argued that the former e⁄ect outweighs the latter leading to an overall decrease in
the cost of bank equity for banks chartered in country B. Speci￿cally, we argued earlier
that in a single economy model proposition 1 tells us that due to presence of strategic
traders when some consumers face a liquidity shock at T = 2, knowing this at T = 1,
depositors demand a marked up expected return (cost of capital) of RD
1￿^ tB￿B per dollar
of deposit to induce them to buy shares. Proposition 2 tells us that when countries are
￿nancially integrated and capital regulations are not credibly enforceable then di⁄erences
in regulatory capture and forbearance lead to depositors demanding a smaller mark up
on the cost of capital of RD
1￿~ tB ~ ￿B
per dollar of deposits, where ~ tB ~ ￿B < ^ tB￿B. This
discussion also gives us the following welfare result.
Corollary 1 (International Spillover and Welfare)
Relative to the case when the two countries are segmented, the spillover of depositors
from country A to country B which results in the reduction in the mark up in the cost of
capital demanded by new shareholders of B￿ s banks leads to an increase in both private
and social welfare in country B. However, there is no change in private welfare in
country A and the impact on social welfare in country A is ambiguous.
Since consumers are risk neutral, summing across all shareholders the expected trad-
ing pro￿ts of strategic traders cancels out with the expected losses of liquidity traders,
that is, trading is a zero sum game. Nonetheless, since old shareholders have the lowest
probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock they are the best placed to trade strategically on
their private information. Consequently, on average, old shareholders have a net trading
gain while new shareholders have a net trading loss. Recall our assumption dWP
dK1 < 0.
Consequently, although old shareholders face a net trading gain at T = 2, we implicitly
assume that the discounted share price (higher cost of capital) on the issue of new equity
at T = 1 more than o⁄sets the T = 2 trading gains.29
With this in mind lemma 3 tells us that the spillover of depositors from A to B
reduces the relative volume of liquidity trades and thus reduces expected trading pro￿ts
to old shareholders. This e⁄ect is, however, countered by the reduction in the aggre-
gate discount on new equity (Proposition 2) and by assumption, the reduction in the
aggregate discount on new equity will be greater than the fall in the expected trading
pro￿ts (including trading costs) leaving the old shareholders in country B better o⁄post
integration. Social welfare in country B also increases due to a reduction in the aggre-
gate cost of gathering information since there is a decline in the number of consumers
29Gorton and Winton (2000) show that this is indeed the case.
23in country B who ￿rstly, buy new equity and secondly satisfy equation (10) and choose
to become informed.
There is no change in the level of capital held by A￿ s banks post integration, nor is
there a change in A￿ s new marginal shareholder￿ s probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock
thus the valuation of A￿ s banks remains constant. On the other hand, some depositors in
country A now hold new equity in country B￿ s banks leading to a fall in social welfare.
This occurs for two reasons, ￿rst, the new shareholders of B￿ s banks who belong to
country A have the highest probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock and are thus more
likely going to be exploited by B￿ s old shareholders - they have an expected net trading
loss while B￿ s old shareholders have a net expected trading pro￿t. Second, some of B￿ s
new shareholders in country A will choose to gather information - which as previously
mentioned is a dead weight loss - imposing a further welfare cost on country A. This
negative impact on social welfare in country A must be weighed up with a positive
spillover that arises from the fact that some depositors in country A now hold shares
in B￿ s banks which are less likely to fail than banks in country A. These contrasting
in￿ uences leaves the impact on the social welfare of country A ambiguous.
Two qualifying points are in order before concluding this section. First, in a world
where countries are symmetric and a bank￿ s investment decision (risk taking) is exoge-
nous, capital adequacy requirements have no e⁄ect on bank risk taking incentives, this
lack of ￿ exibility is the primary source of spillover of depositors from A to B.30 Of course,
if we were modelling the investment side of the story then lower capital standards will
potentially induce greater risk taking by A￿ s banks leading to negative spillover from A
to B. Though whether capital regulations actually reduce bank risk taking is far from
being agreed upon - see for example Kahane (1977), Koehn and Santomero (1980), Lam
and Chen (1985), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), Genotte and Pyle (1991),
Rochet (1992), Besanko and Katanas (1996), and Blum (1999). Second, we have estab-
lished that regulation adopted by country A has an externality on the banks in country
B. If each regulator is concerned only about maximising their own welfare function,
W￿, this externality will, in general not be internalised in the absence of coordination. Is
the scenario, (similar in vain to the conclusions reached by Acharya, 2003; Dell￿ Ariccia
and Marquez, 2001; Holthausen and Rłnde, 2003) where both countries increase their
forbearance, and thereby produce welfare externalities for the other country potentially
an equilibrium outcome? That is, will regulators ￿ race to the bottom￿in an attempt
30However, remember that higher capital levels reduces the probability of bankruptcy, given a level of
bank risk. Thus, capital is still viewed as socially desirable by regulators and is not completely redundant
in the model.
24to either promote their domestically chartered banks or protect their own regulatory
market share? This question is addressed and formalised below.
3.4 A Race to the Bottom?
The previous discussion was made on ceteris paribus grounds. However, when regulators
have discretionary powers, they can respond to regulatory choices of other regulators.
The literature addressing this issue has to the best of my knowledge has almost unan-
imously concluded on the lines that, when responding to lax ￿nancial regulations in
another country, regulators will always choose to reduce regulatory requirements - lead-
ing to the so called ￿ race to the bottom￿or ￿ regression to the worst regulation￿ .
In this section I address whether the spillover caused by ￿nancial integration pre-
sented in the preceding discussion will lead to increased forbearance on a global scale.
The assumptions in the previous section remain here, so the two countries are identical
save that country A is more captured than country B, or ￿A > ￿B. Given the potential
for spillovers to occur, each independent regulator￿ s welfare function now depends not
only on their chosen level of capture or forbearance (and hence level of capital required
to be raised at T = 1) but also on the level of capture in the opposing country. Hence,
the maximisation problem for regulator B is to choose optimally their level of capture

















With this in mind, what is B￿ s optimal response to A￿ s lax enforcement of capital
requirements? We have the following result:
Proposition 3 (No Race to the Bottom)
In equilibrium, the regulator in country B decreases capture and thus forbearance
upon the increase in the capture of the regulator in country A. That is @￿B
@￿A < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
This is a striking result and is in stark contrast to any conclusion previously reached
addressing this issue. This result states that, from a cost of capital point of view,
instead of reacting to A￿ s laxity with an increase in its own forbearance vis ￿ vis capital
requirements, regulators in country B will in fact become less captured and thus be
25less forbearing towards banks chartered in country B, thus demanding a higher level of
capital to be raised at T = 1.
Intuitively this proposition holds for two reasons. Relative to the segmented coun-
try scenario, integration increases private and social welfare e⁄ects of a chosen level
of capture. It follows that for country B to reap as much bene￿t from integration as
possible it makes sense for regulator B to align itself less with bank shareholders and
demand stricter capital requirements. Second, the spillover of depositors from A to B
increases the foreign ownership of B￿ s banks. One would logically expect that domestic
bank regulators to be less concerned about shareholders the higher the fraction of for-
eign ownership, consequently putting a greater weighting on social welfare and demand
higher capital levels.
This result casts doubt - at least in the context of this model - on the argument that
independent regulators will react to lax regulations of opposing countries by weakening
their own regulatory standards. I have demonstrated here that it is at least theoretically
possible that a country will react to lax regulations of other countries by strengthening
their own regulations.
4 Conclusion
In recent years, the progressive integration of international ￿nancial markets has brought
with it an increasing focus on the coordination of regulations across national boarders.
This trend has spurred a debate on the costs and bene￿ts of the international harmoni-
sation of banking regulation. The Basel Capital Accord of 1988 provides a case in point
in regard to the voracity of the debate between the opposing sides. This paper adds to
this debate by investigating the now common claim by banks that the regulations they
face induce an increase in risk ￿a regulatory risk.
The paper de￿nes regulatory risk to be regulations that lead to an increase in the cost
of equity capital. Accordingly, the cost of capital is modelled in a general equilibrium
setting where demand deposits serve a unique role in providing an e¢ cient medium
of exchange. Although bank capital reduces the probability of failure, bank equity is
relatively sensitive to information thus making it a poor hedge against liquidity risks.
Consumers initially hold deposits to the extent they need coverage against liquidity
shocks ￿ those who have the highest probability of being early consumers optimally
choose to hold deposits. A system wide increase in capital will, in the context of the
model, force some depositors to exchange their deposits for their less preferred bank
equity. This increases the probability that the marginal shareholder will su⁄er a liquidity
26shock and thus leads to a mark up on the cost of capital.
However, when regulatory standards di⁄er across countries, a spillover of depositors
from the lax to more stringent country leads to a reduction in the cost of capital mark
up demanded by new shareholders for the stricter country. The bank belonging to the
country with stricter enforcement of regulatory standards is, in e⁄ect, able to ￿ diversify￿
their new equity issuance across countries by selling their shares to consumers with the
lowest risk of su⁄ering a liquidity shock.
This result suggests that an international regulatory agreement such as the Basel
Capital Accord that imposes uniformity on capital requirements may indeed lead to a
higher cost of capital for banks and thus induce greater regulatory risks relative to a
decentralised solution. It suggests that the claims made by banks and other ￿nancial
institutions are at least a theoretical possibility.
Another interesting result was the ￿nding that countries will respond to lax en-
forcement of regulations by neighbour countries by strengthening their own regulatory
standards. This result is in stark contrast to the almost unanimous conclusion reached
by other authors tackling this issue that national regulators will react to lax regula-
tions of opposing countries by weakening their own regulatory standards leading to the
commonly coined phrase ￿ a race to the bottom￿vis ￿ via regulatory standards.
The ￿ndings of this paper support the arguments of the regulated entities. However,
it does not go so far as to make a value judgement as to whether a decentralised approach
to capital adequacy regulation is optimal relative to the harmonising of capital standards
or vice versa. It may be the case that a uni￿ed framework such as Basel is optimal, but
it is also possible that banks in some countries are more e¢ cient and stable than others,
thus necessitating di⁄ering regulatory standards. There is no reason a priori why we
should choose the centralised solution over the decentralised one and vice versa. The
paper simply presents testable implications that warrant empirical investigation, only in
conjunction with comprehensive empirical studies will the tensions between regulators
and the regulated ￿rms be resolved.
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305 Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) The consumer￿ s problem is:
Max
n1(t); D1(t)
EU (C2 (t);C3 (t)) = tC2 (t) + (1 ￿ t)C3 (t) (A1)
subject to
1. C2 (t) = RDD1(t) +
n1(t)
N0+N1(1 ￿ ￿)E1 + G ￿ L
2. C3 (t) = RDD1(t) +
n1(t)
N0+N1E1 + G ￿ L
3. P1n1(t) = D0(t) ￿ D1(t)
4. n1(t) ￿ 0
5. D1(t) ￿ 0
Substitute (3) into (1) and (2) to get C2 (t) = RD [D0(t) ￿ P1n1(t)] +
n1(t)
N0+N1(1 ￿
￿)E1 + G ￿ L and C3 (t) = RD [D0(t) ￿ P1n1(t)] +
n1(t)
N0+N1E1 + G ￿ L. Then substitute
these into (A1) to yield:
Max
n1(t)
EU = RD [D0(t) ￿ P1n1(t)] +
n1(t)
N0 + N1
(1 ￿ ￿t)E1 + G ￿ L (A2)
The Lagrangian for the consumer￿ s problem subject to (4) and (5) is:
b = RD [D0(t) ￿ P1n1(t)] +
n1(t)
N0 + N1
(1 ￿ ￿t)E1 + G ￿ L
+￿n1(t) + ￿ [D0(t) ￿ P1n1(t)] (A3)






E1 + ￿ ￿ ￿P1 ￿ 0;
@b
@n1(t)
n1(t) = 0;n1(t) ￿ 0 (A4)
@b
@￿
= n1(t) ￿ 0;
@b
@￿
￿ = 0;￿ ￿ 0 (A5)
@b
@￿
= D1(t) ￿ 0;
@b
@￿
￿ = 0;￿ ￿ 0 (A6)
31Since the marginal shareholder ^ t is indi⁄erent between holding shares or deposits,
(A5) and (A6) are not binding and thus ￿ = ￿ = 0. Accordingly, (A4) is binding for the
marginal shareholder and rearranging gives us (14) in the text.
Proof. (Lemma 1) Consider the regulator￿ s unconstrained design problem given
by (15). A regulator chooses a level of capital K1 in order to maximise their welfare
























































dK1 < 0, dWS
dK1 > 0, d2WP
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dK2
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+ (1 ￿ ￿)d2WS
dK2
1
i < 0 (A9)
Proof. (Lemma 2) Suppose that ￿A > ￿B then by lemma 1 KA
1 < KB
1 . Consider
￿rst the case where the two countries are segmented. Let ^ tA and ^ tB be the new marginal
shareholder for country A and B respectively then we must have ^ tA < ^ tB. Thus relative
to A, there must be ^ tB ￿ ^ tA more new shareholders in B. However, when the two
countries become integrated then B￿ s banks will sell its new stock to the consumer
that values it most highly irrespective of which country they belong to. Since equity
valuation is inversely proportional to the probability of su⁄ering a liquidity shock it pays
for B￿ s banks to issue some of its new stock to consumers in A who have ^ tA < t < ^ tB
and will therefore value B￿ s shares more highly. Consequently, B￿ s banks should sell
exactly half of the excess capital required over an above the amount raised by A￿ s banks
32to A￿ s consumers and raise the rest domestically. That is, B￿ s banks should sell
^ tB￿^ tA
2
shares to A￿ s consumers and raise the rest domestically. It follows that the new marginal




2 < ^ tB.
Proof. (Lemma 3) The expected value of equity an the end of T = 1, EB
1 , and
the standard deviation across realisations, ￿B, are determined by equations (4) and (5)
respectively. From equations (4) and (5), the only endogenous factor that will change
the expected return or risk of the ￿rm is the new level of deposits that they hold at
T = 1, D1, all other variables are assumed exogenous. From previous discussion we have
that DB
1 = D0 ￿ KB
1 , so the only factor determining DB
1 is KB
1 . Prior to integration
KB
1 = ^ tB￿t￿, post integration KB
1 = ~ tB￿t￿+
￿
~ tB ￿ ^ tA
￿
, but ~ tB =
^ tA+^ tB
2 so substituting
this in gives us KB
1 = ^ tB ￿ t￿ which is the same as the pre-integration level.









However, when the two countries are integrated and there is spillover of depositors



















































However, since n1t is a linear monotonic increasing function and with ^ tA < ~ tB < ^ tB
this cannot be true, thus by contradiction the reverse statement must be true, that is
~ ￿ < ￿. This reduction in the volume of liquidity traders will, ceteris paribus, reduce
the incentive for new shareholders to gather information as given by equation (10). Of
course this leads to a reduction in the number of strategic traders. However, one would
logically expect that the fall in volume of strategic traders to be smaller than the fall in
33the volume of liquidity traders. This is because we orignally assumed that there was a
unique shareholder for which the information gathering condition - equation (10) - held
with equality. That is, the new marginal informed shareholder lay somewhere between
the old marginal shareholder and the new marginal shareholder. Thus, it would be
logical to expect that post integration the marginal shareholder would once again locate
somewhere between the new marginal shareholder and the old marginal shareholder
which determines the number of strategic traders. Accordingly, the T = 2 discount on
country B￿ s bank equity will be higher.
Proof. (Proposition 2) If ￿A > ￿B then by lemma 1 KA
1 < KB
1 . Consider
once again the case where the two countries are segmented. Let ^ tA and ^ tB be the new
marginal shareholder for country A and B respectively then ^ tA < ^ tB. Proposition 1
tells us that the mark up on the cost of capital for new equity issuance at T = 1 is
RD
1￿^ t￿ per dollar of deposit. Therefore, the cost of capital mark up per dollar of deposit
for A is less than that of B￿ s, that is, RD
1￿^ tA￿A < RD
1￿^ tB￿B. Now if the countries become
integrated then lemma 2 tells us that post integration d^ tB < 0, that is, the probability of
the marginal shareholder in country B experiencing a liquidity shock decreases. While
lemma 3 suggests that post integration d￿B > 0, that is, the T = 2 discount (due to the
existence of strategic traders) on B￿ s equity traded in the secondary market increases.
Assuming that d^ tB > d￿B it follows that, post integration, RD
1￿~ tB ~ ￿B
< RD
1￿^ tB￿B. In other
words, the cost of capital mark up per dollar of deposit is lower when the two countries
are integrated with ￿A > ￿B. Moreover, the larger ￿A is, ceteris paribus, the greater the
spillover of depositors and thus the greater the decline in B￿ s new marginal shareholders
liquidity risk (lemma 2) and consequently an even larger reduction in the cost of capital
mark up.
Proof. (Proposition 3) Consider the regulator￿ s unconstrained design problem
given by (16). Regulator B chooses a level of capture ￿B which in turn determines the
level of capital raised KB
1 in order to maximise their welfare function WB
￿ given that
regulator A has chosen its level of capture optimally ￿￿


















































































￿i < 0 (A15)
First, most of the welfare gains post integration accrue to the old shareholders
of the banks in country B, they receive a reduction in the aggregate discount on
new equity while the only bene￿t to social welfare is a reduction in aggregate infor-








A . Second, we have assumed concavity of




































￿ leading to the desired result. To see this con-

























































> 0 and lemma 1 tells us
@KB
1
@￿B < 0 which implies that
@WB
P
@￿B > 0 and
@WB
S
@￿B < 0 leading to the desired result.
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